The virtual stages of hate: Using Goffman’s work to conceptualise the motivations for online hate by Kilvington, D
Citation:
Kilvington, D (2020) The virtual stages of hate: Using Goffman’s work to conceptualise the mo-
tivations for online hate. Media, Culture & Society. 016344372097231-016344372097231. ISSN
0163-4437 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443720972318




Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0
The final version of this paper has been published in Media, Culture & Society by SAGE
Publications Ltd, All rights reserved. c© Daniel Kilvington, 2020. It is available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443720972318
The aim of the Leeds Beckett Repository is to provide open access to our research, as required by
funder policies and permitted by publishers and copyright law.
The Leeds Beckett repository holds a wide range of publications, each of which has been
checked for copyright and the relevant embargo period has been applied by the Research Services
team.
We operate on a standard take-down policy. If you are the author or publisher of an output
and you would like it removed from the repository, please contact us and we will investigate on a
case-by-case basis.
Each thesis in the repository has been cleared where necessary by the author for third party
copyright. If you would like a thesis to be removed from the repository or believe there is an issue
with copyright, please contact us on openaccess@leedsbeckett.ac.uk and we will investigate on a
case-by-case basis.
 1 
The Virtual Stages of Hate: Using Goffman’s Work to Conceptualise the Motivations 





It was originally predicted that reduced social cues on the Internet would result in less 
meaningful interaction meaning that social relationships online could not be significantly 
developed (Hine, 2012). With the benefit of hindsight, this predication could not be further 
from the truth as Web 2.0 and social media platforms, in particular, have revolutionised the 
way contemporary audiences communicate (Nakamura, 2008). Social media dominates our 
daily experiences as we use these platforms to construct our virtual identities, create and 
develop friendships, locate job opportunities, play games, and consume the latest news 
(Farrington et al. 2015; Lind, 2019; Moore et al. 2017). Merunkova and Slerka (2019: 244-5) 
state that ‘Three-quarters of Facebook users log in daily’ while 91 percent of teenagers go 
‘online every day, which is an indication of the importance of cyberspace in their lives’.  
     Hine (2012: 3) suggests that ‘the internet is both a hugely significant social phenomenon 
of our time in itself and, in turn, a fascinating field site for social science research of all 
kinds’. Therefore, research into online interaction and behaviour is of paramount importance 
as offline inequalities are reflected in cyberspace (boyd, 2011; Lind, 2019). Hence, 
investigating online communities and experiences helps us, for example, critically understand 
the social, cultural and economic impact of the digital divide (West and Thakore, 2013) and 
‘white flight’ (boyd, 2011). It also allows us to comprehend the correlation between online 
communication and offline behaviours (Brown, 2009; Keum and Miller, 2018; Williams et al. 
2019). This becomes particularly noteworthy when we consider the increasing levels of 
 2 
online abuse, hatred and discrimination (Home Office, 2019). It is now easier than ever 
before to espouse a hateful message and reach audiences across the world in a matter of 
seconds. This is like a tsunami of hate, cyber-rippling across countries, causing offence, upset 
and pain.  
     This article will attempt to critically understand the motivational factors encouraging 
online hate speech. It will therefore draw on Goffman’s (1959) ground-breaking work on 
self-presentation and then reconceptualise the model after taking into account the differences 
between online and offline communication. It will assess how these differences affect 
performances, and thus individuals’ attitudes towards online derogation. The article explores 
how communication via new media technologies has blurred the boundaries between front 
and backstages. It also investigates the impact online hate exposure has on its audiences, and 
discusses the impact hate has on its victims. The article closes by examining the influence of 
the internet, and social media, and offers key suggestions for future research.   
 
 
Online hate  
 
Hate-speech is defined as spreading, inciting, or promoting hatred, violence and 
discrimination against an individual or group based on the their protected characteristics; 
which include ‘race’, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, among other 
social demarcations. If left unaddressed, hate speech can contribute towards acts of violence, 
and thus, hate crimes. The Home Office of the United Kingdom (UK) government (2019) 
reported that hate crimes have more than doubled in England and Wales since 2013, with the 
majority being racially motivated, accounting for 76% of all offences. And, between 2018-
19, transgender attacks had increased by 37%, while anti-Semitic attacks had more than 
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doubled. Similarly, the F.B.I revealed that hate crimes had reached a 16 year high within the 
United States, with notable increases in attacks against Latino, transgender, and Sikh 
communities (Levin, 2019). Kilvington (2019) attempts to make sense of these increasing 
figures by contextualising the social and political climate across Europe and North America: 
‘When countries lurch through social and political unrest, racism and xenophobia are rarely 
far behind. Brexit and the changing political landscape in the US and Europe have seen 
debates around race, ethnicity and national belonging come to the fore’. 
     Therefore, we are living in tumultuous and hostile times as right-wing politicians have 
gained popularity and support, as observed within the United States (US), UK, Czech 
Republic, and France. Hateful and discriminatory offline behaviour is increasing and presents 
to us a very serious problem. But, to what extent are our online experiences shaping and 
reinforcing our offline behaviours, and vice-versa?   
     With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to judge the New Yorker’s cartoon from 1993, 
which proclaimed that ‘On the Internet nobody knows that you are a dog’ (Everett, 2009; 
Farrington et al. 2015; Steiner, 1993), as misguided. The cartoon postulated that ‘one’s 
identity was so hidden on the Web that opportunities would be widely open to all regardless 
of background characteristics that may have traditionally disadvantaged some people over 
others’ (Hargittai, 2012: 224). Everett (2012: 165) adds that this example, among others, 
‘were symptomatic of [North America’s] desire to imagine and construct colorblind or hyper-
tolerant virtual communities and digital public spheres through the internet’s text-driven 
digital environments during the late 1980s and early 1990s’. These examples present the 
internet as an ‘idyllic, equal and even post-discriminatory world, one where everyone has a 
voice and the right to speak it’ (Farrington et al. 2015: 43). 
     However, everyday offline experiences of oppression, disadvantage and prejudice are 
reflected in online experiences (boyd, 2011; Farrington et al. 2015; Nakamura, 2008; 
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Nakayama, 2017). Nakamura (2008) argues that the internet is an extraordinary example of a 
racialised medium while Nakayama (2017) notes that the culture of whiteness has been used 
to showcase, and reclaim, white supremacy within virtual spaces. People of colour have used 
online platforms to petition, protest and gather support, with Black Lives Matter being a case 
in point, when in contrast, whites are unable to receive attacks in the same way because the 
language for white oppression and discrimination does not transfer (Nakayama, 2017). For 
instance, the Labour politician, Diane Abbott, receives almost half of all abusive tweets that 
are sent to female politicians in the UK (Gayle, 2018). And, Farrington et al. (2015) discuss 
the case of former National Hockey League (NHL) player, Joel Ward, who, after scoring the 
winning goal in a cup final, received hundreds if not thousands of racist tweets which 
included death threats.      
     Not only are individuals targeted by perpetrators and trolls, but so too are communities 
and groups. Demos (2016) reported that worldwide, between March and June 2016, over 4 
million Tweets were sent containing a word that could be considered anti-Islamic. Amnesty 
International (2018) reported that one in ten tweets that mention black women are considered 
abusive. The Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Anti-Semitism (ICCA) (2013) also 
noted that Facebook groups such as Kill a Jew Day, Kick a Ginger Day, Hitting Women, and 
Join if you Hate Homosexuals, had been created and generated online followers.  
     The Internet has allowed users a new platform to spread hate. Hate groups no longer have 
to communicate in isolation, hunt for new recruits, or distribute leaflets on foot. The Internet 
provides them instant access to new and existing followers, and it makes considerably easier 
to mobilise and spread hateful messages (Brown, 2009). Social media, in particular, has 
‘allowed old racial schemata to be broadcast in new social settings anonymously via smart 
phones and computers’ (Cleland, 2014: 417). Hate speech is therefore no longer confined to 
offline spaces, as electronic communications devices are now being used to communicate and 
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spread hatred, allowing individuals and groups the opportunity to reach potentially larger 
audiences than ever before (Brown, 2009; Farrington et al. 2015; Kilvington and Price, 2019, 
2017). As the ICCA (2013: 9) note, extremist and hate groups now ‘host their own websites 
with impunity’, using them to ‘spread propaganda’ and build communities of like-minded 
people.   
     Before exploring the motivations fuelling online hate speech, we must first discuss the 
Goffmanian theory of human communication.  
 
 
Goffman: A theory of human interaction   
 
The pioneering work of Erving Goffman (1922-1982) is central to our understanding of 
human behaviour and communication. Goffman (1959) was the first to employ a 
dramaturgical metaphor to help us make sense of the self within social encounters. Yet, 
Goffman was not the first to write about the self as Rogers’ (1951) work attempted to 
theorise therapy sessions as patients attempted to discover the ‘true self’ in an attempt to 
interact more freely with others, while Jung’s (1953) research distinguished between the 
unconscious self and the public mask, known as the persona. These ideas are, of course, 
influenced from Freud’s archaeological model of the mind, which argues that the true self is 
hidden, buried beneath layers of defences, when engaging in the superficial practices of 
everyday social interaction. It was Goffman’s theoretical model, however, that allowed us to 
further our understanding of how and why individual and group performances differ across 
social contexts. 
     The notion of the façade is particularly noteworthy. This is divided into two parts – the 
stage (setting, e.g. furniture, or in theatre speak, the props) and the personal façade (personal 
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front). The latter encompasses two distinct parts which include the appearance and the 
manner. The appearance refers to the person’s external, or physical, self. Clothes, hair-style, 
make-up, among other visible characteristics, act as ‘sign vehicles’ which allow the observers 
to form judgements. These judgements are often influenced by drawing on previous 
experiences and histories with said ‘sign vehicles’. The manner, on the other hand, relates to 
the person’s behaviour, way of talking, and body language. When communicating on the 
stage, the personal façade enables the performer to both ‘give’ and ‘give off’ expressions. 
Expressions we give are intentional verbal symbols which we utilise to transmit information 
when attempting to generate a particular impression, while expressions given off are non-
verbal and unintentional.  
     Performances are constructed with an awareness of societal and institutional expectations. 
In other words, interaction relationships are ‘organised in particular by the use of shared 
resources and communication rules’ (Serpa and Ferreira, 2018: 74). These rules are learned 
through repetition by drawing on factors that already exist within our repertoire. Masquerades 
are performed until the roles have been mastered. Teachers and pupils, nurses and patients, 
footballers and fans, all assume a role based on preconceived expectations of appropriate 
communication and behaviour. When an individual takes on an established role they are 
already likely to understand the rules and conventions due to prior exposure. Established 
roles, then, generate a ‘collective representation’ which is considered the norm.   
     Goffman (1959: 24) argues that individuals who perform in a certain social context exert a 
‘moral demand’ upon their audience, encouraging them to respond in an expected or 
appropriate manner. As Durkheim (1926: 272) illustrates, then, ‘we do not merely live but 
act; we compose and play our chosen character’. The portrait we paint is modified and 
tailored depending on the audience that we are interacting with. Put simply, individual 
performances are context specific as we decide which persona to adopt. Bullingham and 
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Vasconcelos (2013: 102) note that ‘the self is merely the mask one chooses to wear in a given 
situation’. Goffman (1959) argues that individuals offer different performances within public 
(frontstage) and private (backstage) settings.     
     Like theatre, the front stage is public and includes an audience. Individuals therefore put 
on ‘a show’ and perform a desirable, expected, or anticipated image. Within the frontstage, 
actors are expected to follow the rules governing decorum and politeness in a bid not to 
offend. In the majority of cases, we display compassion and if this rule is broken, the actor 
may ‘lose face’. Performers ‘keep up appearances’ as long as they remain within the 
frontstage, but ‘terminate their performance when they leave it’ (Goffman, 1959: 33).  
     Backstage interaction is antithetical to frontstage performances. Serpa and Ferreira (2018: 
76) state that ‘This is a restricted area, not in the public domain and without access to 
viewers’. In short, when the curtain comes down our public mask is removed. Goffman 
(1959: 129) argues that backstage language and behaviour includes ‘profanity, open sexual 
remarks, elaborate griping, smoking, rough informal dress’. Moreover, it is within this private 
space where more honest, borderline and abhorrent views emanate (Farrington et al. 2015; 
Hylton, 2018, 2013; Kilvington and Price, 2019). Feagin and Picca (2007) and Hughey 
(2011) suggest that overtly racist communication has moved ‘underground’, shifting from 
frontstage to backstage spaces. Collective and derogatory terms, then, are employed to 
describe and label absent audiences which constructs and upholds an ‘in-group-out-group 
split’ (Goffman, 1959: 171). According to Goffman, derogation works to reaffirm the 
solidarity of the team, illustrating the mutual regard against the absent other. These private 
conversations contain ‘dark secrets’ which are kept hidden from the public through team 
solidarity. For an individual to ‘fit in’ to the team, they are expected to participate within 
these private and informal conversations while protecting their fellow team members. Bonds 
are developed and strengthened through ‘team collusion’. 
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     To what extent, though, can Goffman’s theoretical model, notably around frontstage and 
backstage performances, be applied to the internet? In what ways does human interaction 
differ between online and offline worlds and how does this affect behaviour? And, is it 
possible to apply Goffman’s existing model to virtual worlds in an attempt to critically 
understand the motivational factors encouraging online hate? These questions are of 
particular importance now as ‘Hate speech has once more returned “over-ground”, back 
centre stage, and is arguably more public than ever due to the advent of social media’ 
(Kilvington and Price, 2019: 72).   
 
 
Goffman, limitations, and online hate  
 
Goffman’s (1959) theory of human interaction and behaviour was exclusively based on the 
analytic interpretation of face-to-face situations where actors are physically co-present. 
Despite this, a number of scholars have applied Goffman’s work to online spaces in a bid to 
critically understand online behaviour (Aspling, 2011; Bullingham and Vasconcelos, 2013; 
Merunkova and Slerka, 2019; Serpa and Ferreira, 2018). Fewer studies, however, have 
specifically employed Goffman’s theoretical model to critically understand, and theoretically 
underpin, the motivations for online hate-speech (Hylton, 2018; Hylton and Lawrence, 2016; 
Hynes and Cook, 2013; Kilvington and Price, 2019). Although useful, it could be argued that 
Goffman’s original model cannot simply be applied to online interaction when examining 
hate-speech because of the significant differences that exist between online and offline 
worlds, which influence and modify human behaviour.  
     This section will outline four key differences between online and offline communication. 
These differences are: anonymity, invisibility, dissociative imagination, and rapid response. It 
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is suggested that these factors, arguably made possible through online communication, 
encourage disinhibition which exacerbates online hate. Later, the article will develop and 
apply these factors within an updated and reworked Goffmanian model to help us critically 
understand the motivations for online hate. To date, work that applies Goffman’s model to 
cyber-hate remains superficial and under developed as it fails to adequately demonstrate how 
performative stages are compromised, and blurred, when communicating via new media 
platforms.     
 
Anonymity  
Anonymity is widely regarded as a determining factor in online hate-speech. Online users 
have the ability to create fake accounts, or adopt pseudonyms which acts as a form of identity 
disguise which encourages disinhibition. That said, Santana’s (2014) qualitative study on the 
topic of immigration within online forums found that while 65 percent of participants 
submitted hateful comments under the veil of anonymity, the remaining 35 percent posted 
uncivil comments using their real names. Whether anonymous or not, Suler (2004) outlines 
that the perception of anonymity encourages users to manipulate online expressions, view the 
Internet as a space where offline social norms do not apply, and take online interactions less 
seriously. In turn, anonymity, or perceived anonymity, works to ‘embolden people to be more 
outrageous, obnoxious, or hateful in what they say than would be the case in real life’ 
(Brown, 2017: 298-99). For Suler (2004: 322), anonymity affords users the ‘opportunity to 
separate their actions online from their in-person lifestyle and identity’ which results in 
feeling ‘less vulnerable about self-disclosing and acting out’. Through the process of 
dissociation, users do not have to own their behaviour and instead, their online self becomes 
compartmentalised. In sum, disinhibition and deindividuation, facilitated through anonymity, 
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culminate in the polarisation of groups online. Arguably, these exacerbating factors of online 
hate are made possible through invisibility.  
 
Invisibility  
Belk (2014) writes that the self is now extended through digital expressions. But these digital 
expressions are disembodied, resulting in the image, sound and message essentially ‘standing 
in’ for, or replacing, the physical self. Goffman (1959) notes that when we enter another’s 
presence, we make judgements based on ‘sign vehicles’. Online, however, not only do we 
have less visible cues to drawn upon, but they are less trustworthy as digitally embodied 
identities might be fictitious or embellished.  
     Invisibility affects behaviour which can result in hate as aggressors are physically 
removed from their victims. As Farrington et al. (2015) state, ‘If one cannot see others’ 
physical expressions, one is less immediately aware of their dislike or distaste of our actions’. 
In short, online communication allows one to keep one’s eyes averted which compromises 
the Goffmanian model as it is grounded in physical settings for human interaction. However, 
online communication is increasingly combining text, audio and visual interaction. Visual 
interaction is therefore no longer confined to offline communication. Hate can be espoused 
not only through text and images, but also through online live-streaming platforms. Although 
Farrington et al. (2015) and Suler (2004) have stated that perpetrators are unable to physically 
see their victims’ reactions due to online invisibility, they can still be observed through 
representation, i.e. text, emoticons, videos, Gifs, etc. Despite being physically removed, 
perpetrators of online hate are still able to understand the consequences of their online 
expressions. But, significantly, perpetrators might never have to deal with the consequences 
of their actions as they might perform a ‘hit-and-run’ of hate, posting an abusive comment, 
and fleeing the scene of the crime, perhaps never to return (Suler, 2004). Because we can be 
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invisible, then, and potentially escape the ‘crime scene’ undetected, some users may perceive 
Internet communication as a game, a space without consequences, and where different rules 
apply.   
 
Dissociative Imagination   
For some, the internet feels like a ‘make-believe dimension, separate and apart from the 
demands and responsibilities of the real world’ (Suler, 2004: 323). Users are therefore able to 
create personas or embellish aspects of their identities because they disassociate online 
fiction from offline fact. Suler (2004: 323 emphasis added) adds that when users ‘turn off 
their computer and return to their daily routine, they believe they can leave behind that game 
and their game identity’. Now, because technology, for example, has become part of the 
extended self, and embedded within every day practices, we consistently navigate or switch 
between online (perceived as not-real) and offline (real) interactions (Battin, 2017).   
     The act of trolling is thus important to consider. A troll is an internet user who attempts to 
intentionally disrupt the online community or individual by causing upset, offense and 
trouble. Berghel and Berleant (2018) put forward a taxonomy of trolling which includes 
provocation, social-engineering, sport, rehearsal, insult, and satire trolling. A number of these 
categories relate to the concept of dissociative imagination, especially sport, rehearsal and 
insult trolling as this behaviour is considered a game which leads to self-gratification. Cheng 
et al. (2017) illustrate that trolling, like laughter, can be contagious, and that ordinary people, 
placed within certain conditions, can become trolls. They add that a growing number of 
online users are beginning to engage in trolling behaviour within online news forums, finding 
that one fifth of comments uploaded to CNN.com are removed by moderators for violating 
community guidelines. Nakayama (2017) continues, suggesting that people are encouraged to 
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perform in excessive ways online in an attempt to ‘out-do’ the last comment or post by being 
more outrageous in an attempt to gain more attention and reactions.  
     Sanctions have the power to shift the perception of online behaviour from a make-believe 
dimension to a space which has ‘real-world’ consequences for the aggressors. If virtual 
worlds are perceived as separate, it is likely to lower our self-awareness. Coupling 
dissociative imagination with the desire for instantaneous communication on social media 
sites, such as Twitter, leads to posts being disseminated without appropriate consideration of 
the communicative content. The reactionary nature of social media perhaps influences online 
hate (Brown, 2017; Farrington et al. 2015).  
 
Rapid Response 
Many scholars have argued that the Internet has taken over our daily lives, with social media 
being at the forefront (Farrington et al. 2015; Nakamura, 2008). Our smart phone, tablet or 
laptop are usually at arm’s length, or within the palm of our hand, when consuming our 
favourite television programme or watching a football match or concert. In many cases, these 
devices are actually used to stream said content. For McGillivray and McLaughlin (2019: 
33), ‘The media landscape has changed and websites, online content, and social media are 
acting as “second screens” to the primary broadcast via television and are being used 
simultaneously by fans’.  
     The reliance and desire to communicate online has facilitated an ‘addictive call and 
response’ feeling (Manghani, 2009). Serpa and Ferreira (2018) state that social media relies 
on immediate reactions and that if one has less time to think, then it enhances one’s chances 
of posting something hateful. For Brown (2017: 304), ‘the Internet encourages forms of hate 
speech that are spontaneous in the sense of being instant responses, gut reactions, 
unconsidered judgements, off-the-cuff remarks, unfiltered commentary, and first thoughts’.  
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     Trigger events are therefore worth considering as reactive social media posts tend to be 
driven by emotion, almost like a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ (Suler, 2004). Triggers in sport, such as 
a goal being scored or a penalty kick being missed, have resulted in the rapidity of online 
racism (Busby, 2019; Burrows, 2019; Farrington et al. 2015). Stephan and Stephan’s (2000) 
work on realistic and symbolic threats helps us critically understand responses to trigger 
events. While realistic threats refer to resources such as jobs and welfare, symbolic threats 
relate to perceived challenges towards ideologies and values. Realistic threats tend to 
challenge individuals’ livelihood, while symbolic threats are paradoxical to the ‘ingroups’ 
collective belief system. In turn, triggers can lead to online posts which showcase automatic 
prejudice and instant stereotyping, while derogatory language is used without awareness and 
consideration. 
     Rapid response exacerbates online hate, but not all social media platforms encourage 
rapidity, and this is a vital distinction. Twitter, Snapchat, and WhatsApp are built on 
spontaneity whereas LinkedIn, blogs and online forums encourage more planned, considered, 
non-spontaneous forms of speech whereby hateful and borderline views are carefully 
constructed to entice targeted audiences, based on collective worldviews, senses of grievance, 
and so on. Bluic et al. (2018) state that groups and individuals perform hate online for 
different reasons or to achieve different outcomes. They argue that those belonging to a group 
tend to promote and defend hateful ideologies while individuals simply perform hate to hurt 
outgroups in response to trigger events. It is more likely, then, that individuals belonging to 
racist or xenophobic groups will perhaps provide more considered responses in an attempt to 
justify or cultivate their ideology, in contrast to individuals who display one-off or 
intermittent outbursts of hate based on social, cultural or political triggers. The work of 
Richey et al. (2018) illustrate that Twitter users are aware that spontaneity is encouraged, and 
integral to the sites design. Yet, the participants noted that although prolonged reflection was 
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not encouraged, it should be embraced as it allows users to take control, thus avoiding 
posting morally and socially damaging content. 
     This section has critically explored the differences between offline and online interaction 
and behaviour. Offline, we can be anonymous by wearing a mask, a balaclava, or a hood. 
Offline, we can be invisible by writing graffiti on a public wall or by hiding while shouting 
derogatory slurs at passer-by’s. However, offline spaces are not perceived to be ‘make-
believe dimensions’ as social norms and sanctions generally govern behaviour within public 
spaces. Offline, high-prejudiced people may suppress instant stereotypes in public settings 
while in contrast, some online platforms encourage first thoughts which exacerbates online 
hate. Although the features offered to individuals online are not entirely unique to Internet 
communication (Brown, 2017), these differences are still significant enough to seriously 
contest and challenge Goffman’s theoretical model of communication.  
     We cannot simply apply Goffman’s model to virtual communication when attempting to 
understand the reasons for uploading online hate. Goffman’s work must be comprehensively 
rethought, reshaped and remodelled as virtual frontstages and virtual backstages have blurred. 
We now live in a world where it is arguably considered more acceptable to abuse another 
person online, rather than offline (Nakayama, 2017). The internet has provided a platform 
where it is easier, quicker, and cheaper to spread hate, leading to group polarisation and 
mobilisation. The following section explores virtual frontstages and virtual backstages.  
 
 
Exploring Virtual Performances  
 
Goffman (1959) postulates that while performances are in process, ‘audience segregation’ 
occurs; meaning that actors play different parts in other settings. Thus, the actor adopts 
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different personas depending on the expectations of the audience. In conjunction with 
Goffman’s theoretical framework, then, Bullingham and Vasconcelos (2013: 102) note that 
‘online environments provide users with the potential to perform and present different 
identities’. Identity is constructed online, as we choose to project given identities within 
appropriate social settings. Our performances are tailored and constructed around the rules, 
conventions and norms that exist within different virtual environments. By applying 
Goffman’s theory of front and backstage performances, and impressions given and given off, 
to Internet communication, it allows us to conceptually understand individual 
communication, interaction, and behaviour across social media platforms. Put simply, we 
now have virtual frontstages and virtual backstages (Aspling, 2011).   
     Virtual frontstages are regarded as open spaces as audiences are able to browse user 
profiles and make judgements about their character and behaviour (Moore et al. 2017). Due 
to the perceived nature of Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn, individuals modify 
their personas and behaviour based on their perceptions of that space. Merunkova and Slerka 
(2019: 271) note that Facebook users ‘build their image using profile and cover photos, 
shared posts, their interests and also photos where they tag friends. They post only the 
inoffensive and desirable ones on their profile’. Goffman’s (1959) work on impression 
management is particularly noteworthy here as Wallace et al. (2014) illustrate that Facebook 
users tend to consciously ‘like’ other users’ posts to provide a positive, supportive and 
friendly impression of the self. Belk (2014) adds that the practice of ‘liking’ and providing 
flattering comments is common because recipients of such affirmations tend to reciprocate 
for their friends as well. As a result, this online practice appears spontaneous whereas it could 
be regarded as egotistical self-love. Furthermore, Merunkova and Slerka (2019) state that 
users delete posts which acquire no feedback. The absence of reaction and interaction 
illustrates that the post is bad, or boring, and gives off a damaging impression to the audience 
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where the actor loses face. Virtual frontstage performances, then, can be carefully constructed 
and shaped by individuals as we have the power to decide what information is public and 
private.  
     The virtual backstage offers a more personal, relaxed and honest performance (Merunkova 
and Slerka, 2019; Serpa and Ferreira, 2018). This communication, considered safe and 
secure, takes place via closed, direct and private messaging platforms including Facebook, 
WhatsApp and SMS messaging. Merunkova and Slerka (2019: 268) state that Facebook users 
see the border between virtual frontstages and virtual backstages relatively clearly, adding 
that ‘users decide which information to post “publicly” on their profile … and which 
information they intend to share only with selected persons via private messages’. Like 
offline backstage performances, bonds and solidarity are formed within virtual backstage 
spaces meaning that these private interactions remain concealed and protected through ‘team 
collusion’ (Goffman, 1959). Hylton and Lawrence (2016) and Hynes and Cook (2013) 
postulate that hidden virtual backstages are being used to perform derogation and thus team 
solidarity helps prevent against unwanted exposés. For Cain (2012: 669), ‘The two regions 
have a symbiotic relationship in that activities in the backstage allow workers to maintain 
appropriate behaviors during the front stage, while activities provide fodder for discussions 
and activities in the back region’. Hylton and Lawrence (2016) highlight instances where 
public figures have been exposed for committing acts of derogation within virtual backstages 
which have resulted in consequences for the perpetrators. These exposés have the ability to 
undermine the carefully constructed personas that have been created within frontstage and 
virtual frontstage spaces.  
     Although individuals often use virtual frontstage spaces to purport an idealised version of 
the self (Merunkova and Slerka, 2019; Miguel and Medina, 2010; Moore et al. 2017; Serpa 
and Ferreira, 2018), we must consider the influence that anonymity, invisibility, dissociative 
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imagination and spontaneity have upon performances (Brown, 2017; Farrington et al. 2015; 
Kilvington and Price, 2019, 2017; Suler, 2004). Online derogation is not just reserved for 
virtual backstages; it has saturated virtual frontstages as publicly visible online hate speech 
continues to increase (Cheng et al. 2017; Kilvington and Price, 2019, 2017). This seriously 
compromises Goffman’s (1959) original model of self-presentation as virtual frontstage 
performances are not always idealised. The nature of communication, and the conditions in 
which we compose our communication, therefore impacts upon our online social practices 
and behaviours. While Goffman (1959) suggested that frontstage and backstage performances 
were separate and distinct, it could be argued that virtual stages have blurred which 
exacerbates online hate speech.  
 
 
The Virtual Stages of Hate: What Motivates Cyberhate?       
 
New technology is changing our world, and these differences are affecting human 
communication, interaction, and behaviour. Arguably, all virtual communication, whether it 
is posted in a virtual frontstage or a virtual backstage, is created or composed within a space 
that simulates backstage feelings of privacy, safety and security. Problematically, ‘The line 
between private and public is blurred in the context of social media’ because virtual 
frontstages often feel private and personalised despite being public (Merunkova and Slerka, 
2019: 271). It could be suggested that as the communicative content is being composed, the 
output of the message, and thus the intended audience, is not being fully acknowledged. It is 
this ‘backstage mimicry’, encouraged by factors including anonymity and invisibility, that 
has arguably led to an increase in online hate. Figure 1.1 offers a revised Goffmanian model 
and attempts to illustrate how online performances are affected through feelings of 
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disinhibition. These differences enhance feelings of courage and freedom (Brown, 2017; 
Farrington et al. 2015; Keum and Miller, 2018; Kilvington and Price, 2019, 2017; Suler, 
2004) and blur virtual frontstages and backstages.   
 
<INSERT FIGURE 1.1 – The Virtual Stages of Hate> 
 
If this behaviour continues, it desensitises us to it (ICCA, 2013). Hawdon et al’s. (2017) 
study reported that an average of 43 per cent of participants, aged between 15 to 30 years old, 
in the US, UK, Germany and Finland had encountered online hate material. Most of the 
online hate material was experienced on social networks sites, such as Twitter and Facebook. 
For Williams et al. (2019: 6), ‘Far right and popular right-wing activity on social media, 
unhindered for decades due to free-speech protections, has shaped the perception of many 
users regarding what language is acceptable online’. In turn, our online experiences are 
helping shape our ideologies, belief systems and behaviours.   
     The impact of filter bubbles is noteworthy. It has been suggested that the more we 
contribute to these bubbles, by liking posts and following other like-minded individuals and 
groups, algorithms help neaten the bubble. Because ranking algorithms work to filter out 
posts, ‘echo chambers’ are created on social media whereby increasingly extreme viewpoints 
are being consumed (Sunstein, 2007). These ‘echo chambers’ are becoming breeding grounds 
for division and radicalisation (Williams et al. 2019). If an individual spends weeks, months 
or years living inside a filter bubble where racist, sexist or homophobic views are posted with 
impunity, desensitisation may occur. Essentially, filter bubbles are helping blur those virtual 
stages and equipping some people with the confidence to post discriminatory material online.  
     Our experience of news media through social media platforms is also relevant when 
exploring filter bubbles because it has been suggested that media organizations create 
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agendas which are then discussed by online audiences, as opposed to audiences setting their 
own agendas (McCombs, 2014; Williams et al. 2019). Pew Research Centre (2018) reported 
that online sources, including social media, are now more popularly consumed than 
traditional press outlets for news in the US while ‘two-thirds of UK adults, and eight in ten 
16 to 24 year olds now use the Internet as their main source of news’ (Williams et al. 2019: 
7). As a result, algorithms are personalising our social media experiences of news but rather 
than being challenged on belief systems, users’ viewpoints are being reinforced through the 
filter bubble effect (Bruns, 2019). This can be particularly damaging as persistent negative 
framing of communities and groups can influence attitudes and behaviours (Goffman, 1974). 
Tuchman’s (1978) work on symbolic annihilation is crucial as symbolic representations and 
portrayals are a form of power, and if some groups or communities are omitted from the 
bubble, it illustrates and cements their devalued status.  
     The younger generation are now growing up online, living in a hostile, unfiltered, and 
unregulated world which is helping shape their ideologies through social media consumption 
(Merunkova and Slerka, 2019). Lind (2019: 1) states that ‘Worldwide, the average internet 
user is on social media more than five hours per day’ meaning that the filter bubbles’ edges 
become firmer until they are almost impenetrable. Belk (2014) argues that Internet users are 
invested in social media as technological devices become extensions of the self. We are not, 
however, attached to the physical devices for communication; we are attached to what they 
allow us to do. They allow us to interact, learn, engage, comment, share, respond, like, 
compliment, and discuss. Conversely, they also facilitate the spreading of fake news, 
misinformation, violence, hate, discrimination, bullying, and abuse. Belk (2014) asks, will 
this online hate leak into the offline world?   
     In response, research illustrates that where hate speech rises online, it simultaneously rises 
offline (Williams et al. 2019). For example, the United Nations (UN) stated that Facebook 
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played a ‘determining role’ in stirring up hatred against the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar 
(Smith, 2018), while social media was used to fuel the civil war in South Sudan (McCarthy, 
2017). Although trigger events such as immigration, civil unrest, election results and terror 
attacks are responsible for increasing racial and religious tensions, Williams et al’s. (2019) 
research shows that online hate speech is a process as social media users continually discuss 
and debate divisive agendas set by media organisations. Williams et al’s. (2019: 15) superb 
work indicates ‘a strong link between hateful Twitter posts and offline racially and 
religiously aggravated crimes in London’, adding that a rise of 1,000 hate tweets would see a 
‘4 per cent increase in racially or religiously aggravated harassment in a given month’ 
(Williams et al. 2019: 19). Hence, it is essential that research into online communities, 
behaviours and practices is undertaken. It is vital that we understand the factors driving 
online hate, and what the continued exposure to hate and misinformation is having on 
contemporary audiences.    
     In summary, Goffman (1959: 45) said that ‘the world, in truth, is a wedding’. It is a space 
where audiences wear their happiest masks. Honesty is supressed. We smile, laugh and adopt 
the expected character for the duration of the performance. As we navigate frontstage spaces 
we constantly attempt to be the best versions of ourselves. Yet, is this happening online? 
Many virtual spaces have become toxic, littered with nasty insults, bullying, abuse, 
discrimination and hate.   
     Goffman’s remodelled work allows us to understand the motivations for posting online 
hate. The key difference is that online communication is composed within a blurred space 
which mimics the backstage which affects the communicative act. As a result, this affects 
performances and behaviours. The concept of ‘backstage mimicry’ offers us clear insights 
into contemporary audiences’ concealed thoughts and illustrates the importance of research 
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into online communities; it shows that we still have a long way to go in the fight against 





This article has attempted to build a theoretical model, inspired by Goffman’s (1959) work, 
to help understand the factors encouraging online hate speech. Once we understand this 
behaviour we can better attempt to challenge it and plot its demise. It has illustrated that the 
differences between online and offline communication affect performances which impacts 
behaviours. It suggests that boundaries between frontstages and backstages have blurred in 
regards to online communication. As a result, researchers are now able to observe 
contemporary audiences’ attitudes and ideologies which were once reserved for the 
backstage.  
     We must also consider the impact that online exposure to hatred and discrimination is 
having on internet users. Kozinets (2002) argues that virtual social groups influence the 
members who participate in them which affects their behaviour both online and offline. 
Algorithms, which cause filter bubbles, are problematic in that they reinforce attitudes rather 
than challenge them (Bruns, 2019). As Williams et al. (2019) note, social media profiles have 
become echo chambers which are becoming breeding grounds for polarisation and 
radicalisation. It could be suggested that users’ experience of social media is affecting how 
audiences understand the world, and their place within it. With greater exposure to certain 
ideologies, such views arguably become normalised. Therefore, through the features which 
the internet offers, it instils a level confidence in our beliefs and in some cases, encourages 
individuals to post contentious and inflammatory content. For some people, they are 
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beginning to turn online hate speech into real-world offline hate speech and hate crimes 
(Williams et al. 2019). Of course, social media is not solely responsible for the increase of 
hate speech (Kilvington, 2019) as perpetrators’ empathy levels (Brown, 2017), moods 
(Farrington et al. 2015), and the contexts of conversations (Cheng et al. 2017) must be 
considered.  
     Online hate is increasing and evolving which emphasises the importance and timeliness of 
this work. Not only are victims likely to experience abuse more online than offline, they are 
also more likely to experience hateful events or acts repeatedly and in different formats 
because expressions of hate can now be transmitted in multiple forms including texts, photos 
and GIFs (Keum and Miller, 2018). Research on the impact of online victimisation is 
paramount. Surprisingly, however, Bluic et al. (2018) state that only four academic studies 
between 2005 to 2015 explicitly focused on the effects of cyber-racism. Nonetheless, for 
Brown (2017: 307), online abuse might be more damaging than offline abuse because of ‘the 
volume of abuse facilitated by online communication. Moreover, it might be that online hate 
speech has especially harmful effects because it is done in front of larger audiences, thus 
ramping up the public shame element’. Overt racism, for example, is associated with 
depression, low self-esteem and anxiety (Feagin and Elias, 2013; Tynes et al. 2008). These 
consequences also correlate with online abuse as Bluic et al. (2018: 84) state that ‘cyber-
racism has effects which are of similar or higher levels to those of discrimination experienced 
offline’. Put simply, empirical research focusing specifically on the psychological impact that 
online hate, bullying and discrimination has on its victims is essential.  
     In sum, this work has outlined the motivational factors encouraging online hate speech by 
reconceptualising Goffman’s (1959) influential work. Future research should attempt to 
empirically test The Virtual Stages of Hate to further understand online hate. Moreover, 
further research should be conducted into algorithms and filter bubbles to critically examine 
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the ways in which they fragment and polarise audiences. Crucially, it is fundamental that 
victims’ experiences of online abuse, hate and discrimination are empirically captured, 
explored and understood. Once we understand the impact of this behaviour, we are in a 
stronger position to challenge it. The virtual world, in truth, is certainly not a wedding. But 
with greater research, education and action, it is hoped that the virtual stages of hate can 
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